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it is widely held by philosophers not only that there is a causal condition on percep-
tion but also that the causal condition is a conceptual truth about perception. one 
influential line of argument for this claim is based on intuitive responses to a style of 
thought experiment popularized by Grice. Given the significance of these thought 
experiments to the literature, it is important to see whether the folk in fact respond to 
these cases in the way that philosophers assume they should. We test folk intuitions 
regarding the causal theory of perception by asking our participants to what extent 
they agree that they would ‘see’ an object in various Gricean scenarios. We find that 
the intuitions of the folk do not strongly support the causal condition; they at most 
strongly support a ‘no blocker’ condition. We argue that this is problematic for the 
claim that the causal condition is a conceptual truth.
1. Introduction
Many philosophers claim that it is a conceptual truth about perception that ve-
ridical perceptual experiences are caused by the objects that they are experiences 
of. For instance, the following three statements constitute a version of the Causal 
theory of Perception defended by Grice (1961):
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 1.  Necessarily, if a subject sees an object, that object causally affects the sub-
ject.
 2.  Necessarily, if a subject sees an object, that object produces in the subject a 
state reportable by a sentence beginning, ‘it looks to me as if . . .’
 3. 1 and 2 are conceptual truths.
along similar lines, strawson says the following:
[the] notion of the causal dependence of the experience enjoyed in sense- 
perception on features of the objective spatio- temporal world is implicit 
from the very start in the notion of sense- perception, given that the latter 
is thought of as generally issuing in true judgements about the world. it 
is not something we discover with the advance of science, or even by re-
fined philosophical argument . . . . Hence any philosophical theory which 
seeks to be faithful to our general framework of ideas, our general system 
of thought, must provide for this general notion of causal dependence. 
it must, to this extent at least, be a causal theory of perception. (1992: 61; 
see also 1979: 51)
Building on Grice’s ideas, Lewis (1980) combines the causal theory of percep-
tion with a reductive counterfactual theory of causation. He argues that for an 
experience to count as a case of perception, the experience must counterfactually 
depend in the appropriate way upon the scene. More recently, the claim that it 
is a conceptual truth that there is a causal condition on perception has featured 
prominently in influential discussions on the metaphysics of color. Johnston 
(1992) proposes five core beliefs about color, where a core belief about color is a 
belief central to the concept of color. one of these five core beliefs, called ‘Expla-
nation,’ may be seen to imply a causal condition on color perception:
the fact of a surface or volume or radiant source being canary yellow 
sometimes causally explains our visual experience as of canary yellow 
things. (Johnston 1992: 222)
similarly, Jackson claims that it is a “conceptual truth about presentation” that 
“the property of objects putatively presented to subjects when the objects look 
[for example] yellow is at least a normal cause of their looking yellow” (1998: 93). 
He argues from this putative conceptual truth to the conclusion that colors are 
microphysical properties of objects, since physics suggests that it is these proper-
ties that cause color experiences.1
1. there are different forms of the causal theory of perception which are supposed to reflect 
different supposed ‘deep facts’ about how we understand perception, for instance: whether ex-
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Why is it a commonly held belief that it is a conceptual truth that there is a 
causal condition on perception? Probably the best known argument appeals to 
our intuitions (or judgments) regarding a kind of thought experiment popular-
ized by Grice (1961).2 the standard Gricean arguments go like this: We are asked 
to imagine that a subject has a perceptual experience as of an object in front of 
them, and that the object in front of them is exactly as it is perceived to be. it is 
then claimed (at least implicitly) that it is intuitive that the subject fails to see the 
object in front of them. Here is an example of a standard Gricean argument:
suppose it looks to X as if there is a clock on the shelf; what more is re-
quired for it to be true to say that X sees a clock on the shelf? there must, 
one might say, actually be a clock on the shelf which is in X’s field of view, 
before X’s eyes. But this does not seem to be enough. For it is logically pos-
sible that there should be some method by which an expert could make it 
look to X as if there were a clock on the shelf on occasions when the shelf is 
empty: there might be some apparatus by which X’s cortex could be suit-
ably stimulated, or some technique analogous to post- hypnotic sugges-
tion. if such a treatment were applied to X on occasion when there actually 
was a clock on the shelf, and if X’s impressions were found to continue 
unchanged when the clock was removed or position altered then i think 
we should be inclined to say that X did not see the clock which was before 
his eyes, just because we should regard the clock as playing no part in the 
origination of his impression. (Grice 1961: 69)
Here is another example:
it might be that it looked to me as if there were a certain sort of pillar in 
a certain direction at a certain distance, and there might actually be such 
a pillar in that place; but if, unknown to me, there were a mirror inter-
posed between me and the pillar, which reflected a numerically different 
though similar pillar, it would certainly be incorrect to say that i saw the 
first pillar, and correct to say that i saw the second. (Grice 1961: 69– 70)
periences need to be reportable using sentences beginning ‘it seems to me as if . . .;’ whether the 
conceptual claim is restricted to experiences produced via ‘standard causal processes’ (e.g., Grice 
1961; cf. Lewis 1980); whether the causal theory involves a commitment to some form of sense- 
datum theory (e.g., Grice 1961) or is combined with a form of the representationalist theory of 
perception (e.g., strawson 1992; Lewis 1980; Jackson 1998). Nevertheless, the core commitment 
of all these views is that it is a conceptual truth about perception that veridical perceptual experi-
ences are caused by the objects in the environment that they represent. We shall focus on this core 
commitment in this paper.
2. We are not presupposing any particular account of the nature of intuitions. they do not, for 
instance, need to be non- inferential or non- deliberative. intuitions could just be judgments, and to 
say that ‘x is intuitive’ might just be to say that ‘we are inclined to judge that x.’
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the standard diagnosis of why we are not intuitively prepared to ascribe per-
ception in Gricean cases (e.g., the clock and pillar cases above) is that there is 
no causal connection between the object and the subject’s experience. so, as the 
standard diagnosis goes, the existence of a causal connection between the object 
and the experience is (in some sense or another to be discussed later) conceptu-
ally necessary for an experience to count as veridical.
the Gricean style of argument for the conceptual requirement of a causal 
condition on perception is not uncontroversial. typically, however, those who 
oppose the conceptual requirement of a causal condition on perception do not 
deny the intuitive verdicts that Gricean cases are claimed by their proponents to 
elicit. rather, what they normally dispute is whether Gricean cases are sufficient 
to establish that it is a conceptual truth about perception that our perceptual ex-
periences are causally dependent on the way the world is, rather than dependent 
on the world in some other, non- causal way (White 1961; Hyman 1992; roessler 
2011; for further discussion, see allen, 2016: Chapter 5).
Whether the intuitive verdicts that Gricean cases are claimed to elicit are re-
ally intuitive is a question that experimental philosophy can contribute to. to 
date, comparatively little work in experimental philosophy has been done on the 
philosophy of perception.3 However, the results of one study suggest that phi-
losophers’ intuitions about the causal condition may not match those of the folk. 
roberts and schmidtke (2016) tested Johnston’s (1992) core beliefs about color to 
see whether they are agreed with by the folk. they found that although the core 
beliefs Johnston lists were all widely accepted, the least widely accepted was 
Explanation. this suggests that the folk do not strongly endorse the idea that the 
colors cause our experiences of them, and so might suggest that the folk do not 
strongly endorse a causal condition on perception more generally. the present 
empirical study investigates the causal condition further by specifically looking 
at folk intuitions regarding Gricean cases.
We test folk intuitions using two kinds of cases: blocker and non- blocker 
cases. these are the kinds of cases normally presented in support of the caus-
al condition. Blocker cases involve a physical object that blocks the subject’s 
line of sight of the object. the physical blocker interferes with the causal 
processes involved in perception just by being in the way. Grice’s pillar case 
is a blocker case. Non- blocker cases involve interference with the causal pro-
cesses involved in perception too, but, unlike blocker cases, this interference 
3. one of the first studies in the area was by Cohen and Nichols (2010). they used experimen-
tal techniques to argue that our intuitions do not clearly support non- relational views of color. For 
responses to Cohen and Nichols’ study, see roberts, andow, and schmidtke (2014) and roberts 
and schmidtke (2016). a different issue is explored by Fischer and Engelhardt (2016), who provide 
a psycholinguistic debunking explanation of the intuitions appealed to in presentations of the 
argument from illusion.
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is not caused by a physical blocker. Grice’s clock case is a non- blocker case. 
Grice proposes, in the clock case, that the interference could be caused by 
brain stimulation or hypnosis. as both blocker and non- blocker cases inter-
fere with the causal processes involved in perception, if folk intuitions accord 
with the causal condition, the folk should agree that no seeing occurs in both 
types of cases.
although intuitions about the blocker and non- blocker cases are the main 
focus of our study, we also test intuitions regarding the counterfactual depen-
dence of experience on the world. it is natural to think that a counterfactual de-
pendence of the subject’s experience on the world is implied by the causal con-
dition (if a causes B, then if a were removed, B would not occur).4 if the causal 
condition implies a counterfactual dependence, then the folk should agree that 
no seeing occurs when there is no counterfactual dependence. Grice’s quoted 
clock case explicitly states that there is no counterfactual dependence, but the 
quoted pillar case does not. Mirroring this, we made it explicit that there is no 
counterfactual dependence in only some of our cases.
2. The Experiment
Participants. in total, 140 participants completed the survey via the University 
of Warwick’s sona- system. students at the University of Warwick are actively 
recruited to join the sona- system. Faculty who wish to join are able to do so, 
but the primary participant pool is university students. seven participants were 
excluded, because they had formal training in philosophy (6 were currently en-
rolled in a philosophy program, and 1 had earned a Ba in philosophy). a fur-
ther 65 participants were excluded for answering one or more comprehension 
questions incorrectly. of the remaining 68 participants, 47 identified as female, 
65 identified as current students, 2 identified as not being current students, and 
1 did not identify their student status. the median age of the 68 participants 
was 21 years (SD = 5.57). Participants were asked to type in what their native 
language was. the responses to the six biggest language groups were as follows: 
38 participants typed in ‘English,’ 6 ‘Chinese,’ 5 ‘Malay,’ 4 ‘spanish,’ 2 ‘German,’ 
and finally 2 ‘Portuguese.’
4. Consider, for example, Woodward’s characterization of broadly ‘difference- making’ theo-
ries of causation, according to which “the presence of the cause makes a difference to the effect in 
the sense that in a situation in which the cause is appropriately different, the effect will or would 
be different” (2011: 232).
the idea that a counterfactual dependence is implied by the causal condition should not be 
confused with Lewis’s (1980) idea that the causal condition can be reduced to a condition involv-
ing counterfactual dependence.
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Materials. the survey was created and administered using Qualtrics, Version 
2015. the data was analyzed with iBM sPss, Version 22.
Procedure. Consenting participants were presented with a practice case be-
fore considering the six cases of interest in a random order. Each case was pre-
sented over three screens. the initial screen presented just the case. For example, 
in the practice case, the initial screen read: ‘You are currently taking a survey 
online. You should read each case carefully before advancing to the 4 questions 
about it. this is only a practice case.’ to advance, the participants clicked the 
advance button. the second screen included the case at the top followed by three 
comprehension items. the comprehension items were three statements, and par-
ticipants were asked to say for each statement whether it was true or false. For 
every case, one comprehension item was false. For the practice case, the compre-
hension items were the following: ‘this is a practice case;’ ‘You should read each 
case carefully;’ and ‘You will be asked 10 questions about each case.’ the third 
screen included the case at the top and the target question below: ‘on a scale 
from 1 (disagree strongly) to 10 (agree strongly), how much do you agree with 
the statement: “i feel ready to proceed to the remaining cases.”.’
the six cases of philosophical interest were presented following the same 
pattern as the practice case. Four cases were designed to create a two- by- two 
factorial with blocker as one factor and explicit as the other (see table 1).
two of the cases were blocker cases (Pillar and Dog) and two were non- 
blocker cases (Clock and snake). Blocker cases involve something literally in 
the way of one’s vision, and non- blocker cases do not. two of the cases made it 
explicit that there was no counterfactual dependence (Dog and Clock) and two 
did not (Pillar and snake). We thought adding the complication to only some of 
our cases allowed us to examine a trade- off between precision and brevity. We 
were concerned about our cases being too long and so perhaps too hard to un-
derstand for our participants; however, we were also concerned about the cases 
not being clear. We wanted to anticipate both types of concerns so we would be 
better able to respond to them. additionally, we included one case we presumed 
participants would not agree with (Elephant) and another case we presumed 
they would agree with (tomato). the cases used can be seen in table 2.
Let us explicitly state how the study worked for the six cases of philosophi-
cal interest. the first screen presented the case. the second screen presented the 
table 1.   
Blocker Non-blocker
Explicit Dog Clock
Non-explicit Pillar snake
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three comprehension questions (one of which was always false). the third screen 
presented the chief question of interest, ‘on a scale from 1 (disagree strongly) 
to 10 (agree strongly), how much do you agree with the statement: “You see 
the . . .”;’ in the snake case, for example, the statement in question read: ‘You see 
the actual snake.’ the procedure as described so far can be seen in appendix a, 
where we have included screen captures of the survey.
after responding to all six cases, participants were asked about their gender, 
age, whether they had any formal training in philosophy, to type in the name of 
their native language, and to tell us about any additional concerns. Finally, they 
were told to enter their email address to be considered for the lottery draw. typi-
cally, participants completed the survey in about six and a half minutes (Mdn = 
388.5 seconds, iQr = 327 – 552 seconds).
Results. Participants disagreed with the Pillar case the most (M = 2.1, Mdn = 
1.0, Mode = 1.0, SD = 2.2), followed by Dog (M = 2.4, Mdn = 1.0, Mode = 1.0, SD = 
2.1), Elephant (M = 2.6, Mdn = 1.5, Mode = 1.0, SD = 2.4), Clock (M = 4.4, Mdn = 4.0, 
Mode = 1.0, SD = 3.2), snake (M = 4.7, Mdn = 4.0, Mode = 1.0, SD = 3.4), and finally 
tomato (M = 9.4, Mdn = 10.0, Mode = 10.0, SD = 1.9). For each case, the percent 
who selected each response option (1- 10) is displayed in Figure 1. For Pillar, ap-
proximately 67% responded 1, so most of the bar is the darkest black color; while 
for tomato, approximately 80% responded 10, so most of the bar is the lightest 
grey color. the remaining cases are between these two descriptively speaking. 
table 2
Dog it looks to you as if there is a black dog in front of you. there is a black dog in 
front of you. But you are wearing a virtual reality headset that is presenting an 
image being recorded of an exactly similar dog which is behind you. Due to the 
virtual reality headset, it would look to you as if there were a black dog in front of 
you even if the actual dog in front of you walked away.
Pillar it looks to you as if there is a pillar in front of you. there is a pillar in front of you 
(Pillar 1). But unbeknownst to you, there is a mirror between you and it, which is 
reflecting a different pillar (Pillar 2) that is the same in every respect to Pillar 1.
Clock a scientist is stimulating your brain so that it looks to you as if there is a clock in 
front of you. as it happens, there really is a clock in front of you that matches ex-
actly how things look, but the scientist would make it look to you as if there were 
a clock even if there were not one.  
snake You have taken a drug that effects your brain so that it looks as if there is a snake 
in front of you. as it happens, there really is a snake in front of you that looks 
exactly that way.
tomato Nothing weird is going on. You are looking at a tomato directly in front of you, 
and so, as is normal, you visually experience the tomato as being directly in front 
of you.
Elephant You are looking at a tomato directly in front of you, but because of a drug you 
visually experience an elephant instead.   
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the finding that Elephant is between the blocker and non- blocker cases is de-
scriptively surprising and will be discussed in the next section. (However, as will 
be seen, Elephant was not statistically different from Pillar.)
in Figure 1, the bars for the blocker cases are strikingly similar and sug-
gest greater disagreement than the bars for the non- blocker cases, which are 
also quite similar. the same similarities do not appear across explicit and non- 
explicit cases. this suggests that participants may be more strongly affected by 
whether a case includes a blocker component than a component that makes the 
lack of a counterfactual dependence explicit. to compare these responses sta-
tistically, we thought to use a repeated- measures aNoVa but did not, because 
the scores are not normally distributed. the distribution problem is particularly 
pronounced for the Clock and snake cases. Participants’ responses to these cases 
indicate mass between- subject disagreement. the mode was 1 for both cases, 
with 25% choosing this for the Clock case and 22% for the snake case. However, 
the next most frequently chosen response for both cases was 10, with 15% choos-
ing this for Clock and 21% for snake. Noting this, we chose to use Friedman’s 
test to compare responses, a non- parametric test similar to a repeated- measures 
aNoVa.
the results of the Friedman’s test were significant, indicating some differ-
ence between the cases, X2 =187.60, p < 0.001. all 15 post hoc comparisons were 
Figure 1.
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then conducted. the Bonferroni correction was applied to interpret the results.5 
to be deemed significant the unadjusted p- value obtained had to be less than 
0.003333 continuing. the unadjusted p- values are reported in the text. tomato 
was significantly higher than all the other cases (p’s < 0.001). Neither of the block-
er cases were different from Elephant (p’s > 0.12). However, regarding the non- 
blocker cases, although Clock was not different from Elephant (p = 0.01), snake 
was different from Elephant (p < 0.001).
the remaining post hoc comparisons revealed a main effect of blocker. a 
main effect is an effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable across 
the levels of another independent variable. in the present experiment, there is an 
effect of blocker (an independent variable) on participants’ agreement (a depen-
dent variable) across the two levels of explicit (another independent variable). 
a main effect of blocker is obtained because there was a significant difference 
in participants’ responses across both the explicit cases (participants agreed less 
with Dog than Clock, p = 0.003) and non- explicit cases (participants agreed less 
with Pillar than snake, p < 0.001).
a main effect of explicit was not obtained. there was not a significant dif-
ference in participants’ responses across both the blocker cases (participants’ re-
sponses to Dog and Pillar did not differ, p = 0.31) and non- blocker cases (partici-
pants’ responses to Clock and snake did not differ, p = 0.18). For completeness, 
the remaining post hoc comparisons are that the difference between Pillar and 
Clock was significant (p < 0.001), and the difference between Dog and snake was 
significant (p < 0.001).
3. Discussion
We shall discuss our results for the blocker/non- blocker cases, the explicit/non- 
explicit cases, and the Elephant case. then, we will look at what our results mean 
for the view that the causal condition on perception is a conceptual truth. We 
argue that our results are problematic for the view. Next, we will look at some 
alternative explanations for our results and defuse them. We then will examine a 
number of objections against our methodology. Finally, we end by offering some 
interesting directions for future research.
Blocker/Non- Blocker. the strong disagreement elicited by the blocker cases 
shows that the folk strongly judge that there is a no blocker condition on per-
ception. Can we say that the folk strongly judge there to be a causal condition 
5. the Bonferroni correction is as follows: 0.05 divided by the number of tests. Here the num-
ber of post hoc comparisons was 15, so 0.05/15 = 0.003333 continuing.
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(assuming that this is what the Gricean cases establish)? No. Here is why. the 
non- blocker cases elicited much more agreement than we thought they would 
and were significantly different from the blocker cases. although the means and 
medians were below 5 for the non- blocker cases, there was mass disagreement 
regarding how they should be rated. the modes were 1 for both non- blocker 
cases, but the second most common response was a 10. if the folk judge that 
there is a causal condition on perception, they presumably should disagree with 
both the blocker and non- blocker cases. thus, our results do not seem to sup-
port the view that the folk strongly judge that there is a causal condition. Given 
our results, it would be wrong to say that the folk disagree with the non- blocker 
cases. We can at most s ay that a large percentage of people disagree with the 
non- blocker cases, keeping in mind that a sizable percentage agree. it is a no 
blocker condition, not a causal condition, to which folk intuitions strongly point.
a clarification is called for regarding what we mean by a ‘no blocker condi-
tion.’ a no blocker condition is simply this: necessarily, if a subject sees an object, 
then there is no physical thing blocking or in the way of the subject’s line of sight. 
this condition is much weaker than the causal condition. the causal condition is 
as follows: necessarily, if a subject sees an object, that object causally affects the 
subject. in any situation in which the no blocker condition fails, the causal condi-
tion will presumably also fail, but the opposite is false: there can be situations in 
which the causal condition fails but the no blocker condition does not, namely 
the situations described in Clock and snake. thus, to replace the causal condi-
tion with the no blocker condition would be to increase the number of situations 
in which people can be said to ‘see.’ Given this clarification, our results suggest 
that the intuitions about when one ‘sees’ of many non- philosophers are more 
liberal than those of philosophers.6
Explicit/Non- explicit. there was no main effect of explicit. that is, whether or 
not a case explicitly stated that there was no counterfactual dependence did not 
affect participants’ responses. Keeping in mind that we should be cautious of 
making an inference of no difference from a negative result (Machery 2012; Hoe-
nig & Heisey 2001), we can think of two possible explanations of why it might be 
that not explicitly mentioning a counterfactual dependence has no effect. First, 
the lack of an effect could be due to participants inferring the lack of counterfac-
tual dependence even in cases where it is not explicit. alternatively, the lack of 
an effect could be due to participants not judging a counterfactual dependence 
6. a no blocker condition may seem to imply that we do not see the person, in the relevant 
sense of ‘see,’ who is on the other side of, for example, a video call. However, whether this is true 
in fact depends on what the correct way of understanding video calls is. Perhaps, video calls are 
transparent to one’s line of sight (like a pane of glass), so that we see through the video call to the 
person to whom we are speaking, directly.
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to be that important. Philosophers think counterfactual dependence is at least 
implied by the causal condition. so, participants may judge that a counterfactual 
dependence is not that important, because they judge that the causal condition 
is not that important. as our evidence from the blocker/non- blocker cases sug-
gests that participants do not strongly endorse a causal condition, we suspect 
that the second explanation has something to do with our results. However, we 
cannot rule out the first stated possibility. Further research would be required to 
fully understand how important counterfactual dependence is to the folk. our 
present study, though, focuses on folk intuitions regarding the causal condition 
more specifically.
Elephant. the finding that the disagreement with the blocker cases was de-
scriptively higher than the disagreement with Elephant was surprising. al-
though the difference was not significant, we might speculate anyway as to what 
might have been going on. one idea is that some participants were influenced by 
the description of the Elephant case as being one in which ‘You are looking at a 
tomato . . .’. Perhaps some of our participants took this to imply that the tomato 
is thereby seen, and so implicitly treated Elephant as a case of illusion (rather 
than as a case of hallucination) in which the tomato is seen (incorrectly) as an 
elephant (because of the drug taken). this idea is consistent with the findings 
of Fischer and Engelhardt (2016) that statements of the form ‘s is aware of an 
F’ and ‘s perceives an F’ are strongly stereotypically associated with the ascrip-
tion to s of an epistemic achievement (such that s knows that it is an F that she is 
aware of/perceives), and this strong stereotypical association supports an auto-
matic inference from the verbs ‘to be aware of’ and ‘to perceive’ to an epistemic 
achievement (e.g., successfully seeing the tomato in our Elephant case).7 Further 
investigation would be needed to confirm our proposed explanation of the El-
ephant case, although settling this matter does not bear on our interpretation of 
the results for Pillar, Dog, snake, and Clock. the locution ‘You are looking at . . .’ 
was not used in these cases.
Conceptual truth. if we are interpreting our results correctly, what should 
we conclude about the status of the claim that the causal theory of perception 
is a conceptual truth? We interpret our results to show that it is a no blocker 
condition to which folk intuitions strongly point rather than a causal condi-
tion. if this is correct, then, as we will argue in this section, our results put 
pressure on the claim that it is a conceptual truth that veridical perceptual 
7. Fischer and Engelhardt (2016) do not explicitly consider statements of the form ‘s looks 
at X,’ although it is plausible that ‘looks at’ will behave in a similar way to ‘aware of.’ they also 
found that locutions of the form ‘X looks F to s’ are stereotypically associated with the ascription 
to s of an inclination to believe that X is F, which suggests that ‘looking at’ should at least support 
automatic inferences to doxastic ascriptions about X to s.
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experiences are causally dependent on the subject’s environment. We look at 
what our results mean under restricted and more liberal notions of ‘concep-
tual truth.’
Exactly what it takes for something to be a conceptual truth is controver-
sial. one popular view, which is operative in the debate we are considering, is 
that it involves something like being ‘relatively immediately acknowledgeable 
by any person, whatever their education, who can count as having the concept 
in question’ (snowdon 1980: 176). on this way of understanding ‘conceptual 
truth,’ it is not clear given our results that the causal theory of perception is a 
conceptual truth.8 our results are that a significant number of participants were 
quite content holding that they would see the actual object in non- blocker cases. 
amazingly, 21% of our participants strongly agreed, choosing a response of 10, 
that they would see the actual snake in snake and 15% that they would see the 
actual clock in Clock. (Given that there is no main effect of explicit, it is not clear 
that the counterfactual dependence of our experience on the environment is a 
conceptual requirement either, but we will not focus on this fact. We are mostly 
concerned with the causal condition.)
if the causal theory of perception is not a conceptual truth in this sense, then 
what is it? it would presumably be a widely accepted empirical, or more gener-
ally theoretical, belief about perception. that is, it would be like claims such as 
‘whales are mammals’ and ‘water is H2o.’ these are claims that most modern 
people accept, even though it is possible to possess the concepts of WHaLE and 
WatEr and either be agnostic about, or even deny (Vandewall 2007) their truth 
(for a similar suggestion, see snowdon 1980: 176).9
according to this empirical/theoretical belief explanation, the bimodal re-
sponses to the non- blocker cases would reflect the fact that not all participants 
appealed to these widely held empirical, or more generally theoretical, beliefs 
when responding to snake and Clock. one objection to this explanation is that 
all of our participants were educated to university level, and so it would seem 
reasonable to believe that they should all share the relevant empirical, or more 
generally theoretical, beliefs about perception, just as we would expect the ma-
jority of (if not all) undergraduate students to believe that whales are mammals 
8. Views according to which perceptual experiences depend non- causally on the environ-
ment typically require that experiences exhibit counterfactual dependence on the environment. so, 
our results also put pressure on one common line of resistance to the causal theory of perception: 
that responses to Gricean cases fail to establish that we implicitly believe that experiences causally 
depend on our environment, as opposed to depending on the environment in some other non- 
causal way (White 1961; Hyman 1992; roessler 2011).
9. snowdon (1980) does not distinguish between widely accepted empirical and widely ac-
cepted theoretical beliefs about perception. However, there may be important differences between 
these kinds of beliefs, depending on exactly where the boundary between the empirical and the 
theoretical is drawn.
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and that water is H2o. However, in reply, it might be suggested that the rel-
evant empirical, or more generally theoretical, beliefs about perception are not 
as widespread as the relevant views about whales and water. Further, partici-
pants could hold the relevant empirical or theoretical beliefs without appealing 
to them when responding to the cases.10
Not every way of understanding what it is for something to be a ‘conceptual 
truth’ (or perhaps more generally, a core common sense belief) draws a sharp 
distinction between conceptual and empirical or theoretical beliefs. one might 
therefore grant that the causal condition is not a conceptual truth in the restrict-
ed sense given to it by snowdon and others but insist that, in a broader sense, 
it does represent a conceptual truth. according to proponents of the so- called 
‘Canberra Plan,’ for instance, the role of conceptual analysis in philosophical 
theorizing is to identify a set of platitudes relating to something that we want to 
give a philosophical account of. intuitions about cases are supposed to help us 
to identify the relevant platitudes; these platitudes in turn provide an implicit 
theory of the thing in question, and the thing in question is then identified with 
whatever turns out to make the theory true (e.g., Jackson 1998; Braddon- Mitchell 
& Nola 2009). there are different views of what these platitudes can include. 
although they can be restricted to what would traditionally be thought of as 
conceptual or analytic truths, they need not be: they can also include platitudes 
that represent empirical or theoretical beliefs (see, e.g., Nolan 2009).
However, even if the platitudes are not narrowly restricted to analytic truths, 
they will, at least when providing philosophical analyses of folk concepts, like 
perception, color, and the mental, standardly be restricted to claims that are 
widely accepted by ordinary users of the relevant concepts. the reason for this 
is that conceptual analysis, on this view, is intended to ‘fix the subject’ of philo-
sophical investigation. Where philosophical investigation concerns something 
that we have folk concepts of, or folk theories about, we are typically interested 
in that thing as we ordinary conceive of it. if we were not, we would risk simply 
changing the subject and providing a philosophical account of something else 
(see, e.g., Jackson 1998). so, even given a more liberal understanding of ‘concep-
tual truth,’ such as that which might be employed by someone implementing 
the Canberra plan, the present findings put pressure on the claim that the caus-
al theory of perception is a conceptual truth. although the causal condition is 
10. Winer et al. (2002) have shown that it is possible to elicit (seemingly) extramissionist in-
tuitions about perception, according to which something leaves the eye when we perceive, in a 
sizeable proportion of subjects, even amongst university students who have just completed an 
introductory course on vision science. Winer et al.’s diagnosis is that extramissionist responses 
are widespread and resistant to training, because they reflect the phenomenology of visual ex-
perience. it might be suggested that agreement with non- blocker cases similarly reflects a way of 
thinking about perception grounded in the phenomenology of experience.
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widely accepted, there is a large minority of subjects who seem to reject it. thus, 
it would not seem that Canberra planners can consider the causal condition to 
be a platitude about perception for the purposes of enacting the Canberra plan.
it might be argued that the claim that the causal theory of perception is a 
conceptual truth is not undermined by the finding that there is mass between- 
subject disagreement with non- blocker cases, if it is allowed that some concep-
tual truths are more difficult to grasp than others. so, for instance, it might be 
suggested that ‘all unmarried men are unmarried men’ is easier to grasp than 
‘all bachelors are unmarried men’ (assuming that this is a conceptual truth). By 
comparison, it might be suggested that blocker cases are easier to grasp than 
non- blocker cases, and that those who agree with non- blocker cases are sim-
ply mistaken in their judgments. one possible explanation for why participants 
find non- blocker cases more conceptually difficult than blocker cases could be 
that they are further removed from the types of perceptual situations that most 
people are likely to encounter.
the use of comprehension questions to assess participants’ understanding 
of the cases give some reason for questioning this argument. Moreover, par-
ticipants did not seem to struggle more with the comprehension items for the 
non- blockers than the blockers.11 this said, the comprehension questions alone 
do not provide a decisive reason for rejecting the relevant concern: the com-
prehension questions do not directly test the kind of conceptual understand-
ing that participants who agreed with non- blocker cases are being said to lack. 
regardless, the specific suggestion that subjects might find non- blocker cases 
conceptually more difficult because they are further removed from reality is not 
obviously true. Dog and snake seem about equally far removed from the types 
of perceptual situations that most people are likely to encounter. Virtual reality 
headsets are still rare and most people have never used them. We have no way 
of knowing the prevalence of drug use amongst our participants, but a drug 
induced hallucination is not that far removed from a vivid dream, which many 
will have experienced at least once. thus, it is at best unclear that the blocker 
cases would be easier to grasp than the non- blocker cases. in fact, given that the 
blocker cases are more involved, one might think that if anything, the blocker 
cases are harder to understand than the non- blocker cases, not the opposite.
Ultimately, whether the idea that non- blocker cases are more difficult can 
be used to salvage the claim that the causal condition is a conceptual truth de-
pends on wider considerations about the nature of conceptual truths. the idea 
in question would at least need to reject the kind of characterization of ‘con-
ceptual truth’ suggested by snowdon, according to which a conceptual truth is 
11. the number of participants who accurately answered all three comprehension items for 
each case are as follows: Dog 107, Pillar 110, Clock 111, and snake 119. the Chi- squared test indi-
cated that there were no significant differences (X(3) = 3.49, p = 0.32).
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“relatively immediately acknowledgeable by any person, whatever their educa-
tion, who can count as having the concept in question” (snowdon 1980: 176). at 
this point, the challenge for our opponents is to provide a substantive character-
ization of ‘conceptual truth’ that allows for the non- arbitrary distinguishing of 
those propositions that are conceptual truths from those propositions that are 
either non- conceptual truths, or not truths at all. Whether this is possible is out-
side the present article’s scope.
Alternative Explanations. We interpret our results to show that it is a no block-
er condition to which folk intuitions strongly point rather than a causal condi-
tion. is this the correct interpretation of our results? one alternative explanation 
is that the between- subject disagreement about non- blocker cases reflects differ-
ing ways of understanding perceptual verbs like ‘see.’ Perceptual verbs like ‘see’ 
have object- entailing uses, such that we are only prepared to say that someone 
sees, for example, a red tomato, if the red tomato is actually there. Used in this 
way, ‘see’ is what ryle calls a ‘success verb’ (2000). However, perceptual verbs 
also have uses that are not object- entailing, as when we say of someone suffering 
from delirium tremens that they see pink rats.12 it might be suggested that when 
people agree with the non- blocker cases, Clock and snake, that they are under-
standing ‘see’ in a non- object entailing way. Moreover, it might be suggested 
that this way of understanding ‘see’ highlights an innocuous ambiguity in uses 
of perceptual verbs that does not contradict the causal condition. one problem 
with this alternative explanation, however, is that we included the word ‘actual’ 
in the blocker and non- blocker statements (with which we asked participants 
to indicate their agreement), so that the statements read, for example, ‘you see 
the actual snake.’ thus, the structure of these statements hinders ‘see’ as being 
understood as non- object entailing.
it might be replied that there is a phenomenal reading of ‘see the actual 
snake’ according to which it means something like, ‘have an experience like that 
of seeing the snake that actually is in front of you’ (cf. Fischer & Engelhardt, in 
press). if this reply is correct, it would be problematic for us, because the use of 
the word ‘actual’ in the statements would not guarantee that our participants un-
derstood ‘see’ in an object- entailing way. For this objection to be successful, some 
explanation would be needed for why ‘see the actual . . .’ would be understood 
by our participants differently in the blocker and non- blocker statements. one 
suggestion might run as follows: non- blocker statements are read as employ-
ing a phenomenal, non- object entailing sense of ‘see,’ because non- blockers are 
implicitly treated as cases of hallucination; whereas, blocker statements are read 
as employing an object- entailing sense of ‘see,’ because blockers are implicitly 
12. Compare this to factive vs. non- factive uses of the term ‘knows.’ For discussion of a re-
lated objection to there being differences in intuitions about Gettier cases, see Weinberg, Nichols, 
and stich (2001).
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treated as cases of illusion, in which an object (e.g., a dog or a pillar) is seen as 
occupying a different location to the location that it in fact occupies.13
We are sceptical about whether there is an available phenomenal reading 
of ‘see the actual . . .’ and if there is, whether it is sufficiently natural to explain 
the results that we have found. Moreover, the suggestion in question leaves 
some important things unexplained. First, it is unclear why non- blocker cases 
would be interpreted as hallucinations and blocker cases not. second, it is un-
clear why non- blocker cases being treated as hallucination cases would result in 
non- blocker statements being understood as employing a phenomenal sense of 
‘see.’ Further development of the suggestion in question would be interesting, 
but is outside the scope of our paper. Ultimately, how people understand the 
statements is an empirical matter that requires further investigation. 
a second alternative explanation of our findings is that there is a widespread 
understanding of the disabling conditions for perception (those factors which 
‘block’ perception) but a lack of consensus about the enabling conditions for per-
ception (those factors which make perception possible).14 in particular, it might 
be thought that some are treating the scientist (who is stimulating the subject’s 
cortex in Clock) and the drug (which is making it seem as if there is a snake in 
snake) as enabling conditions of the causal process by which a veridical experi-
ence is produced. as such, it might be suggested that the mass between- subject 
disagreement with Clock and snake does not mean that the folk do not find a 
causal condition on perception intuitive. rather, the disagreement just reflects a 
disagreement about what is required for the things that we perceive to cause our 
experiences. the difficulty with this response, however, is that both Clock and 
snake are framed in a way that is intended to discourage this kind of reading: 
snake and Clock by noting that the match between the experience and the envi-
ronment is coincidental (‘as it happens’); Clock also by explicitly noting the lack 
of a counterfactual dependence of the experience on the world. this suggests 
that those participants who agreed with Clock and snake were not implicitly 
thinking of the scientist and the drug as part of a genuine, albeit non- standard, 
causal chain.
Objections to methodology. We shall now turn to considering a number of objec-
tions to our experiment and its methodology. We will avoid meta- philosophical 
objections about the value of intuitions in philosophy (Ladyman & ross 2007; 
Dorr 2010; Maclaurin & Dyke 2012). these debates are outside the scope of this 
article. as we said, we are concerned with objections to the methodology of our 
experiment only. We will look at three objections of this kind: an objection to the 
13. We would like to thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion and for encouraging us 
to think about the general line of argument being discussed.
14. For further discussion of ‘disabling’ and ‘enabling’ conditions of perception, see richard-
son (2015). 
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effect that we used a repeated- measures design; an objection to the effect that 
we dropped many participants’ responses; and an objection to the effect that our 
sample was largely university students. We respond to these objections in turn.
the first objection is that we used a repeated- measures design. the concern 
here is that this design allows for order to affect the results, for example, whether 
participants got Pillar first or second, Clock first or second, and so on. We were 
aware of such concerns. Because of practical issues with getting enough par-
ticipants to look at order for six cases, we sought to address this concern via 
randomizing the order cases were presented to participants. it is true that even 
with randomization that order can affect the results. However, looking at partici-
pants’ responses grouped according to order, we see no signs that order had an 
impact. Most importantly, Pillar and Dog are disagreed with more, descriptively 
speaking, than Clock and snake regardless of order. thus, while there are cer-
tainly not enough participants in each order to statistically test for order effects, 
descriptively, there is no clear reason to worry. this said, future research could 
choose to investigate possible order effects. anyone interested in this should 
consider reducing the number of cases they examine. Note that with 6 cases 
there were 720 orders while with 4 cases there would be 24 orders, so examin-
ing order effects becomes untenable without a large participant database very 
quickly.
the second objection is that we dropped almost half of our participants. in 
reply, normally, the concern with excluding so many participants is that doing 
so introduces a selection bias that may skew the results. in our case, the selection 
bias introduced was intended: to bias the results towards those who understood 
the cases. as we are interested in participants’ responses to the six cases as pre-
sented, it is important that participants’ responses are to the cases as present-
ed. thus, it is important to exclude participants who failed any comprehension 
questions. if they did not understand the cases, they could not respond to them 
as presented, as opposed to their incorrect interpretations of them. it is unfortu-
nate that so many failed to get all the comprehension questions correct. this is 
plausibly due to participants rushing through the experiment and so not paying 
attention. this is always a problem with online surveys and why comprehension 
questions must be used.
a final objection is that our participants were largely university students in 
the UK. the worry is that our results might not generalize to the population at 
large. there is no clear reason to suspect that our sample explains our results. 
We dropped participants who had university experience with philosophy, so the 
worry would have to be that non- philosophy university students are different 
from the population at large. For this worry to undermine our main arguments 
in this paper, what would need to be shown is that the non- causal condition 
intuitions of the university educated are somehow an artifact of their university- 
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level education. However, that just does not sound like a very plausible explana-
tion. if anything, one might expect that the number of people who did not accept 
the causal condition would rise when looking at the general population. By con-
trast, it seems much more plausible to suppose that causal condition intuitions 
are the result of a general scientific education.
regardless, when criticizing our results for being based on university stu-
dents, it is important to be aware of the advantages of using university students 
in addition to the disadvantages. For one, we knew our participants would all 
have a certain degree of education. so, we could be sure that many would have 
the skills required to read and understand the cases presented. We could not 
ensure that members of the general public would have the skills required. it is 
plausible that the percent who failed our comprehension items would have been 
even higher were we to have used the general public. this said, this study is the 
first of many experiments that need to be conducted to produce a solid body of 
evidence regarding people’s intuitions about the causal theory of perception. 
this study should be seen as encouraging, not discouraging, further research 
into the subject.
Future research. We have discussed in passing various avenues for further 
research already. However, we wish to conclude by mentioning three possible 
directions for further research we think are especially interesting. as we find 
mass between- subject disagreement regarding the non- blocker cases, an obvi-
ous future research project is to try to ascertain what explains the disagreement. 
in the present article, we take the stance that the disagreement is explained by 
participants really having different intuitions. this we point out is a problem 
for the claim that the causal theory of perception is a conceptual truth. in the 
section ‘alternative explanations,’ we looked at two possible alternative explana-
tions and found neither particularly convincing. However, we welcome further 
research into alternative explanations. if our findings could be explained away, 
then that would be interesting.
a second possible direction for future research is to look into whether the dif-
ference we found between blocker and non- blocker cases is consistent across all 
the senses. there is some evidence that people recognize a metaphysical distinc-
tion between color and sound on the one hand and gustatory taste on the other 
(roberts & schmidtke 2016), where participants judge the former to be more 
anti- relational and the latter to be more relational. Could views about such meta-
physical differences impact participants’ responses to blocker and non- blocker 
cases? it would be especially interesting if people recognized a causal condition 
for some perceptible properties (e.g., tastes) but not others (e.g., colors). a fur-
ther related question would be whether cases concerning senses that are thought 
to be transparent by many philosophers (e.g., vision) invoke different folk intu-
 Folk Intuitions about the Causal Theory of Perception • 747
Ergo • vol. 3, no. 28 • 2016
itions regarding the causal condition than those senses less commonly thought 
to be transparent (e.g., smell).
the third possible direction for future research that we wish to discuss is to 
look at cross- cultural divergence. (our data does not allow for us to comment 
on cross- cultural differences, as our sample was mainly composed of native En-
glish speakers.) it is interesting to note that there is a structural similarity be-
tween Gricean cases and Gettier cases. What might this mean? in Gricean cases, 
a subject’s experience represents the world correctly but does not count as per-
ception, while in Gettier cases a subject’s belief represents the world truly but 
does not count as knowledge. there is some evidence that Gettier cases exhibit 
cross- cultural variation (Weinberg, Nichols, & stich, 2001). thus, the structural 
similarity might mean that we should expect cross- cultural variation in Gricean 
cases too.
Further research has cast doubt on the claim that folk intuitions about Get-
tier cases really exhibit cross- cultural variation (Nagel, Juan, & Mar 2013), and 
so it might turn out that no significant cross- cultural variation would be found 
for Gricean cases either. this in itself would be an interesting result. However, 
we should not assume that no cross- cultural variation would be found for Grice-
an cases, because at least some folk intuitions do seem to exhibit cross- cultural 
differences: for instance, Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and stich’s (2004) finding 
that there is significant cross- cultural divergence between Western and East 
asian peoples’ intuitions about descriptive theories of names seems robust. Fur-
ther, there is a particularly interesting cross- cultural question relating to our 
experiment: is the mass between- subject disagreement about non- blocker cases 
consistent between cultures? if so, this would suggest a widespread fundamen-
tal disagreement about perception.
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